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I.

INTRODUCTION

Joseph Dwyer, a Private First Class medic who was deployed to fight
the war in Iraq in 2003, became an instant hero when an Army Times photographer took a picture of him, dressed in his full combat gear, as he rescued an injured Iraqi child near the Euphrates River.1 This photograph ap1. The Associated Press, GI in Famous Photo Defeated by His „Demons‟: A Hero
to Many, He Writhed and Died in Private Hell After Returning From War, MSNBC, July 21,
2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25775792/ [hereinafter Demons].
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peared on several magazine covers around the world.2 Although Dwyer
insisted that he did not deserve the special attention for his act, he was recognized with many awards for his heroism.3 Sadly, however, no one knew
of the deep and painful battles the hero would face with himself once he
returned home.4
When Dwyer came back to the United States in June of 2003, about
three months after he was deployed, his family and friends became worried
about his extreme weight loss—Dwyer had lost over fifty pounds while he
was overseas.5 Although he still seemed to be the fun-loving guy he was
before his deployment, those around Dwyer quickly noticed changes in his
behavior.6
At restaurants, Dwyer requested to be seated in a place where his back
would be against a wall so that he had a clear view of his surroundings—he
wanted to eliminate the possibility of someone being able to sneak up on
him.7 He stopped going to movie theatres because of the crowds.8 Dwyer
even began talking about how the “desert landscape around El Paso, and the
dark-skinned Hispanic population, reminded him of Iraq.”9
Although Dwyer was given antidepressant prescriptions, his condition
only worsened.10 He had a car accident because he thought he saw a roadside bomb and swerved off the road to dodge it.11 Dwyer began answering
the door with a gun in hand, he began sniffing inhalants to the point of disorientation, and thought Iraqis were all around him.12 In the summer of

2. Id.
3. Id. (“Dwyer was given a „Hometown Hero‟ award by child-safety advocate John
Walsh; the Army awarded him the Combat Medical Badge for service under enemy fire. The
attention embarrassed him. „Really, I was just one of a group of guys . . . I wasn't standing
out more than anyone else.‟”).
4. Id.
5. Id. (“When he deployed, he was pudgy at 6-foot-1 and 220 pounds. Now he
weighed around 165, and the other Musketeers immediately thought of post-traumatic stress
disorder.”).
6. Demons, supra note 1.
7. Id. (“At restaurants, Dwyer insisted on sitting with his back to the wall so no
one could sneak up on him.”).
8. Id. (“He turned down invitations to the movies, saying the theaters were too
crowded.”).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Demons, supra note 1 (“One day, he swerved to avoid what he thought was a
roadside bomb and crashed into a convenience store sign.”).
12. Id. (“He began answering his apartment door with a pistol in his hand and
would call friends from his car in the middle of the night, babbling and disoriented from
sniffing inhalants . . . Matina told friends that he was seeing imaginary Iraqis all around
him.”).
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2005, Dwyer was treated for his inhalant addiction, but he needed more
help.13
That October, when Dwyer‟s superiors went to his apartment in order
to convince him to receive medical treatment, he “barricaded himself in.
Imagining Iraqis swarming up the sides and across the roof, he fired his
pistol through the door, windows[,] and ceiling.”14 After much effort by
Dwyer‟s brother, he calmed down and sought psychiatric treatment.15
After the treatment, Dwyer told a magazine that he was afraid a post
traumatic stress disorder diagnosis would affect his job opportunities as a
policeman.16 Dwyer elaborated, saying that many soldiers are “suffering in
silence”17 and are shying away from counseling out of fear for damaging
their careers.18 He said, “I'm a soldier . . . I suck it up. That's our job.”19
In January of 2006, Dwyer and his family moved back to their home
state of North Carolina, where the terrain was less likely to remind him of
Iraq.20 But his situation did not improve. While celebrating the Fourth of
July with his family on their deck, Dwyer ran into his house and took cover
under his bed when the fireworks went off.21 Problems with Dwyer‟s mental instability continued, as the police had to be called for incidents related
to post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).22 After Dwyer purchased a new
rifle and made death threats, he once again checked into a medical center
for several months.23 His father said the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs‟ “solution was a „pharmaceutical lobotomy.‟”24 But when Dwyer
completed the treatment, his symptoms returned within days, and his wife
decided to move out—taking their daughter with her.25
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. (“After a three-hour standoff, Dwyer's eldest brother, Brian, also a police
officer, managed to talk him down over the phone. Dwyer was admitted for psychiatric
treatment.”).
16. Demons, supra note 1 (“Dwyer told Newsday that he'd lied on a postdeployment questionnaire that asked whether he'd been disturbed by what he'd seen and
done in Iraq. The reason: A PTSD diagnosis could interfere with his plans to seek a police
job.”).
17. Id.
18. Id. (“[Dwyer] said he hoped to become an envoy to others who avoided treatment for fear of damaging their careers.”).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Demons, supra note 1.
22. Id. (“In June 2007, police responded to a call that Dwyer was „having some
mental problems related to PTSD.‟”).
23. Id. (“„He said that he was coming to my residence to get his gun back,‟ she
wrote in the June 25, 2007, complaint. „He was coming packed with guns and someone was
going to die tonight.‟”).
24. Id.
25. Id.
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Dwyer continued on his downward spiral. He “patrolled” at night and
he hid knives all over his house in order to protect himself.26 In his final
days, Dwyer started to disclose his feelings to his parents.27
What bothered him most, he said, was the sheer volume of
the gunfire. He talked about the grisly wounds he'd treated
and dwelled on the people he was unable to save. His nasal
membranes seemed indelibly stained with the scents of the
battlefield—the sickeningly sweet odor of rotting flesh and
the metallic smell of blood. Yet despite all that, Dwyer
continued to talk about going back to Iraq. He told his parents that if he could just get back with his comrades and do
his job, things would right themselves.28
The day Dwyer died, he was lying on the floor and did not have the
strength to open the front door of his house for the taxi cab driver he had
called to take him to the hospital.29 After police officers arrived and kicked
his door open, they found “Dwyer lying on his back, his clothes soiled with
urine and feces.”30 surrounded by cans of Dust-Off.31 Although paramedics
were able to get him into an ambulance, Dwyer died a half hour later.32
His friends and family remain heartbroken that the joyful young man
they loved “returned a tormented, confused disillusioned shadow of his
former self that was not being given the help he needed.”33
Unfortunately, Joseph Dwyer is only one of thousands of United States
servicemen who have gone overseas to fight the war in Iraq and Afghanistan who have developed PTSD. He is just one example of why the U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) needs to put forth an efficient system
in which it can offer disability compensation and medical care for those
who risked their lives to serve the United States and who have returned
with mental disabilities such as PTSD.
This Comment analyzes two main aspects of the disability compensation and medical care claims procedures within the United States Depart26. Demons, supra note 1 (“He reverted to Iraq time, sleeping during the day and
„patrolling‟ all night. Unable to possess a handgun, he placed knives around the house for
protection.”).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Demons, supra note 1.
32. Id. (“Unable to stand or even sit up, Dwyer was hoisted onto a stretcher. As
paramedics prepared to load him into an ambulance, an officer noticed Dwyer's eyes had
glassed over and were fixed. A half hour later, he was dead.”).
33. Id.
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ment of Veterans Affairs under procedural due process for veterans who are
suffering from PTSD. More specifically, the claims procedure is addressed
under the test laid out in the Supreme Court decision of Mathews v. Eldridge.34 This Comment argues that the first element of the test, in which it
must be shown that a “private interest will be affected by the official action,”35 is satisfied because a veteran‟s disability compensation and medical
care benefits qualify as property interests. Next, this Comment argues that
the second prong of the Mathews test, “the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,”36 shows that the VA
claims and medical procedures in the Veterans Judicial Review Act of
198837 do not have a high risk of erroneous deprivation.38 This conclusion
is based on the analysis of procedural due process claims asserted by two
veterans groups, Veterans for Common Sense and Veterans United for
Truth, in recent cases against the VA.39 These claims are that the lack of
neutral decision-makers and the lack of an additional procedure enabling a
veteran with a mental health emergency to challenge the timing of medical
care if he is given a later appointment do not create a high risk of erroneous
deprivation. Finally, this Comment argues that the third prong of the test,
the government‟s interest,40 is not high because the substitution and addition of procedures would be burdensome to the VA. Because the second
and the third prongs are not satisfied, veterans do not have a valid procedural due process claim regarding neutral decision-makers within the VA
and lack a procedure allowing a veteran, who was turned away for a later
appointment, to challenge the timing of his obtainment of medical care during a mental health care emergency.

34. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Veterans Judicial Review Act of 1988, 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (2006 & Supp. II
2008).
38. See infra Part IV.B.
39. Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1081-82 (N.D.
Cal. 2008); Veterans for Common Sense v. Nicholson, No. C-07-3758 SC, 2008 WL 114919
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008); Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief under the United
States Constitution and Rehabilitation Act at 50, Veterans for Common Sense v. Nicholson,
No. C-07-3758 SC (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008), 2007 WL 4718845.
40. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 355.
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HISTORY AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON PTSD AND
VETERANS

WHAT IS PTSD?

PTSD is a disorder in which an individual develops “characteristic
symptoms” triggered by watching or being involved with a severely traumatic event that may have threatened his life or caused serious injury.41
Those who experience PTSD may be the victim of the traumatic event
themselves, could have a loved one who suffered from the event, or may
have been witness to a loved one‟s or stranger‟s encountering the traumatic
event.42 Although PTSD can be triggered by many different types of events,
it was first brought to national attention when war veterans returned home
from the battlefield, particularly Vietnam War veterans.43
People who suffer from PTSD generally change from the way they
used to be before experiencing the traumatic event.44 They seem to be apathetic, do not enjoy the activities they used to, are irritable, and become
more aggressive and violent.45 Those who have the disorder often have
flashbacks to the horrific event and feel as if they are reliving it.46 It can be
as simple as hearing a similar sound to those heard during the traumatic
event—like Joseph Dwyer, who heard fireworks go off and thought of either gunshots or bombs blasting and ran for cover under his bed.47 PTSD
affects 7.7 million adults in the United States today and often coexists with
depression and substance abuse.48
B.

VETERANS WITH PTSD: WORRISOME STATISTICS

PTSD and war veterans are especially related. A recent 2008 RAND
study shows that since October of 2001, 1.6 million American troops have
been deployed to fight the War on Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan and that
most have been subjected to long periods of combat stress and many unfor-

41. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS‟N, DSM-IV: DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 424 (4th ed. 1994).
42. National Institute of Mental Health, Anxiety Disorders: Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder,
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/anxiety-disorders/post-traumaticstress-disorder.shtml (last visited Apr. 26, 2010).
43. ERIC T. DEAN, JR., SHOOK OVER HELL: POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS, VIETNAM, AND
THE CIVIL WAR 14-15 (1999).
44. National Institute of Mental Health, supra note 42.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id.; Demons, supra note 1.
48. National Institute of Mental Health, supra note 42.
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gettable traumatic events.49 The study found that 300,000, almost 20% of
all of those deployed, or one out of five, suffer from PTSD or major depression.50 Half of the servicemen said they had a friend who was badly injured
or died, almost half said they saw non-combatants get badly injured or die
as well, and about 10% said their traumatizing moment came from when
they were hurt directly themselves.51
Furthermore, the study found that almost half of all who suffer from
PTSD or major depression do not seek help because they are scared that
such a diagnosis could harm their career.52 But out of all of the veterans
who do seek treatment, only half of them actually receive it—and usually,
the treatment received is considered to be “minimally adequate”53 by researchers.54
C.

THE PROCESS OF FILING A PTSD CLAIM WITH THE VA AND RECEIVING
MEDICAL CARE

The United States Department of Veterans Affairs carries out many responsibilities—it provides pensions, healthcare, vocational rehabilitation
and employment, compensation to dependants and survivors, and burial
benefits for veterans.55 Included in this list is the VA‟s responsibility for
providing compensation and medical care for veterans who have a serviceconnected disability.56
The VA uses a grading system in order to determine the amount of
compensation a veteran receives.57 The grading system is based on the level
of diminished earning capacity from a civil occupation caused by the injury
suffered.58 There are ten grades of disability available, such as 10%, 20%,

49. Press Release, RAND Corporation, One In Five Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans
Suffer
from
PTSD
or
Major
Depression,
(Apr.
17,
2008),
http://www.rand.org/news/press/2008/04/17/index.html.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. RAND Corporation, supra note 49.
55. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, A Summary of VA Benefits: Putting
Veterans First, http://www.vba.va.gov/VBA/benefits/factsheets/general/21-00-1.pdf (last
visited Apr. 26, 2010).
56. 38 U.S.C. § 1155 (2006).
57. Id. (“The Secretary shall adopt and apply a schedule of ratings of reductions in
earning capacity from specific injuries or combination of injuries. The ratings shall be based,
as far as practicable, upon the average impairments of earning capacity resulting from such
injuries in civil occupations.”).
58. 38 U.S.C. § 1155 (2006).
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through 90% and 100%.59 When the VA is determining the compensation
for a veteran with a mental health disability, the veteran‟s condition will be
assessed by an examiner, but the VA will consider evidence that shows
impairments in other settings, such as occupational or social.60 The agency
says by allowing this, the assessment is not solely based on the veteran‟s
condition at the time of examination.61 However, the agency will not base
the rating on the veteran‟s social impairments alone.62 Also, if the soldier is
released from active duty because of an event that caused such severe and
traumatic stress, he or she should not receive less than a 50% rating.63
However, there is a specific formula that the VA‟s rating boards must
follow in assigning mental disability ratings for mental disorders such as
PTSD.64 The VA limits its guidelines to the disability ratings of 100%,
70%, 50%, 30%, 10%, and 0%.65 Regardless of the particular mental disorder that a veteran is diagnosed with, the VA analyzes all mental disorders
using this same set of guidelines.66 They are the following:
Total occupational and social impairment, due to such
symptoms as: gross impairment in thought processes or
communication; persistent delusions or hallucinations;
grossly inappropriate behavior; persistent danger of hurting
self or others; intermittent inability to perform activities of
daily living (including maintenance of minimal personal
hygiene); disorientation to time or place; memory loss for
names of close relatives, own occupation, or own
name ................................................................................ 100
Occupational and social impairment, with deficiencies in
most areas, such as work, school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood, due to such symptoms as: suicidal
ideation; obsessional rituals which interfere with routine
activities; speech intermittently illogical, obscure, or irrelevant; near-continuous panic or depression affecting the
ability to function independently, appropriately and effec59. Id. (“The schedule shall be constructed so as to provide ten grades of disability
and no more, upon which payments of compensation shall be based, namely, 10[%], 20[%],
30[%], 40[%], 50[%], 60[%], 70[%], 80[%], 90[%], and total, 100[%]. The Secretary shall
from time to time readjust this schedule of ratings in accordance with experience.”).
60. 38 C.F.R. § 4.126(a) (2008).
61. Id.
62. Id. § 4.126(b).
63. Id. § 4.129.
64. Id. § 4.130.
65. 38 C.F.R. § 4.130 (2008).
66. Id.
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tively; impaired impulse control (such as unprovoked irritability with periods of violence); spatial disorientation;
neglect of personal appearance and hygiene; difficulty in
adapting to stressful circumstances (including work or a
worklike setting); inability to establish and maintain effective relationships ............................................................... 70
Occupational and social impairment with reduced reliability and productivity due to such symptoms as: flattened affect; circumstantial, circumlocutory, or stereotyped speech;
panic attacks more than once a week; difficulty in understanding complex commands; impairment of short- and
long-term memory (e.g., retention of only highly learned
material, forgetting to complete tasks); impaired judgment;
impaired abstract thinking; disturbances of motivation and
mood; difficulty in establishing and maintaining effective
work and social relationships ........................................... 50
Occupational and social impairment with occasional decrease in work efficiency and intermittent periods of inability to perform occupational tasks (although generally functioning satisfactorily, with routine behavior, self-care, and
conversation normal), due to such symptoms as: depressed
mood, anxiety, suspiciousness, panic attacks (weekly or
less often), chronic sleep impairment, mild memory loss
(such as forgetting names, directions, recent events)........ 30
Occupational and social impairment due to mild or transient symptoms which decrease work efficiency and ability
to perform occupational tasks only during periods of significant stress, or; symptoms controlled by continuous medication................................................................................. 10
A mental condition has been formally diagnosed, but
symptoms are not severe enough either to interfere with
occupational and social functioning or to require continuous medication .............................................................. 067
The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has acknowledged,
however, that these guidelines are not necessarily requirements to obtain a

67.

Id.
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specific rating, but instead are examples of conditions that would be associated with a given rating.68
The VA also has a fixed amount of money associated with each rating
group.69 For example, someone who is given a 10% rating will only receive
$123 per month, 30% will receive $376, a 50% rating will receive $770,
and 100% will receive $2673 per month in disability pay.70 If veterans disagree with the rating they are given from the rating board, they have one
year to appeal after they receive notification from the VA about their disability compensation; this process can be lengthy.71 They must first provide
the VA office that made the decision regarding their rating with a written
notice of disagreement.72 The VA will then give the veteran a “Statement of
the Case,” which explains the facts and laws used by the department to arrive at its conclusion.73 The veteran then has sixty days to file for a substantive appeal and the decision will go to the Board of Veterans‟ Appeals
(BVA), which decides cases on behalf of the VA secretary. 74 Ultimately, if
the veteran is still dissatisfied when the final decision is given by the Board
of Veterans‟ Appeals, he or she can appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims, which is independent of the VA.75 However, this court
does not conduct trials or allow the admission of new evidence.76
In addition to disability compensation, veterans are also provided with
access to medical services.77 The VA provides health care to veterans with
service-connected disabilities.78 The VA also provides health care services
for five years starting the day of the veteran‟s discharge or release from
68. Hoke v. Peake, No. 07-0042, 2008 WL 5111468, at *1 (Ct. Vet. App. Nov. 26,
2008); see also Mauerhan v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 436, 442 (2002) (“[E]stablishing one
general formula to be used in rating more than 30 mental disorders, there can be no doubt
that the Secretary anticipated that any list of symptoms justifying a particular rating would in
many situations be either under- or over-inclusive. The Secretary's use of the phrase „such
symptoms as,‟ followed by a list of examples, provides guidance as to the severity of symptoms contemplated for each rating, in addition to permitting consideration of other symptoms, particular to each veteran and disorder, and the effect of those symptoms on the claimant's social and work situation.”).
69. Department of Veterans Affairs, Federal Benefits for Veterans, Dependents &
Survivors,
2009,
at
20,
http://www.va.gov/opa/publications/benefits_book/federal_benefits.pdf.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 95.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Department of Veterans Affairs, Federal Benefits for Veterans, Dependents &
Survivors,
2009,
at
95,
http://www.va.gov/opa/publications/benefits_book/federal_benefits.pdf.
75. Id. at 96.
76. Id.
77. 38 U.S.C. § 1710(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
78. Id.
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active service, if the release was after January 23, 2003.79 The benefits of
the system include free medical care and medications related to the serviceconnected disability.80 The VA is to also provide readjustment counseling
and related mental health services for a veteran who has mental disorders
and trouble readjusting to civilian life.81 A mental and psychological assessment can be given to determine the disorder the veteran has and to determine if he or she does indeed have trouble readjusting to civilian life.82
After receiving the request from a veteran, who must have been involved in
combat against a hostile force during armed conflict after November 11,
1998,83 the VA must give the veteran an assessment as soon as practicable,
but no later than thirty days.84 If the assessment done by a physician or psychologist employed by the VA determines that it is necessary for the veteran to receive care for readjusting to civilian life because of mental health
issues, the VA will provide services.85 These services may include consultation and counseling.86

III.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS

The concept of due process can be found in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, where it is written
that the government—federal or state—cannot deprive a person “of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”87 These clauses have been
interpreted in two different scopes, divided into substantive due process and
79. Department of Veterans Affairs, VA Healthcare: Combat Veteran Eligibility,
June 2009, http://www4.va.gov/healtheligibility/Library/pubs/CombatVet/CombatVet.pdf
(last visited Apr. 26, 2010).
80. Id. at 1 (“Combat veterans who were discharged or released from active service
on or after January 28, 2003, are now eligible to enroll in the VA health care system for 5
years from the date of discharge or release. This means that combat veterans who were originally enrolled based on their combat service but later moved to a lower priority category
(due to the law‟s former 2-year limitation) are to be placed back in the priority for combat
veterans for 5 years beginning on the date of their discharge or release from active service. . .
. Combat veterans who were discharged from active duty before January 28, 2003, but who
did not enroll in VA health care system now have 3 years to enroll and receive care as combat veterans. This 3-year period of enhanced eligibility begins on January 28, 2008, and
expires on January 27, 2011.”).
81. 38 U.S.C. § 1712A (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
82. Id.
83. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1712A(a)(3), 1712(a)(1)(B)(iii), 1712A(a)(2)(B) (2006 & Supp. II
2008).
84. 38 U.S.C. § 1712A(a)(3) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
85. 38 U.S.C. § 1712A(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
86. 38 U.S.C. § 1712A(b)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
87. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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procedural due process.88 While substantive due process focuses more on
issues that are concerned with the constitutionality of statutes and laws,89 a
procedural due process analysis focuses on the procedures the government
should use before depriving a person of an interest.90 Therefore, the arguments of veterans groups against the VA‟s procedures concerning disability
compensation and medical care are procedural issues because they involve
the procedures used by the VA when depriving veterans of their property
interest. As a result, it is clear that a procedural due process analysis is required.
A.

THE MATHEWS V. ELDRIDGE TEST

In order to determine the constitutionality of procedures under the Due
Process Clause, the Supreme Court developed a test in the landmark case of
Mathews v. Eldridge91 that it has since relied on to decide related claims. 92
Eldridge was a man who received disability benefits under the Social Security Act, starting in June 1968.93 Almost four years later, he was mailed a
questionnaire, regarding his disability, from a state agency that was monitoring his condition.94 After the state agency received Eldridge‟s completed
questionnaire, it determined that he no longer qualified for the disability
benefits he had been receiving, and it notified him of the termination of
benefits in July 1972.95 Although Eldridge could have asked for reconsideration from the agency, he challenged the constitutionality of the procedures used to determine if he had a disability.96
The Court looked at three different areas in determining the merits of
Eldridge‟s claim, looking first at whether Eldridge had an interest that was
affected by the procedures in place.97 The Court stated that the deprivation
caused by the termination of disability benefits is not comparable to the
termination of welfare benefits.98 Next, the Court examined “the fairness
and reliability of the existing pre-termination procedures, and the probable
88. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 523 (2d
ed. 2002); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 556 (2004).
89. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915); see
also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 88, at 556.
90. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 88, at 523 (defining procedural due process as the
“procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property”).
91. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
92. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 88, at 558.
93. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323.
94. Id. at 324.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 325.
97. Id. at 340.
98. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341.
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value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards.”99 The Supreme Court
said “the degree of potential deprivation that may be created by a particular
decision is a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of any administrative decision-making process.”100 The Court doubted that the additional
safeguard of an evidentiary hearing would be valuable for avoiding erroneous deprivation.101 The last area the Court examined in Mathews was the
government‟s interest.102 The Court stated that a government‟s interest is
analyzed by accounting for administrative burdens and financial costs.103
The Court determined that there would be a great financial burden if the
government was required to provide pre-termination hearings and continue
to pay disability benefits to individuals while they were participating in the
appeals process.104 After analyzing the three areas, the Court held that an
evidentiary hearing is not required before terminating disability benefits
and that the current procedures satisfy due process.105
The Supreme Court has applied the Mathews test frequently. The test
examines:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government‟s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.106
Furthermore, federal district courts have used the Mathews test when
analyzing due process claims from veterans groups in recent decisions.107
Although the Mathews test has been criticized for giving the courts too
much discretion,108 it permits the courts to effectively balance the interests
of the affected parties.109
99. Id. at 343.
100. Id. at 340-41 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
101. Id. at 346-47.
102. Id. at 347.
103. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 349.
106. Id. at 335; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 88, at 558-59.
107. Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1060-61 (N.D.
Cal. 2008); Veterans for Common Sense v. Nicholson, No. C-07-3758 SC, 2008 WL
114919, at *15-16 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008).
108. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 562 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (“This customary „balancing‟ inquiry conducted by the Court in these cases
reaches a result that is quite unobjectionable, but it seems to me that it is devoid of any prin-
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ANALYZING PTSD DISABILITY COMPENSATION AND MEDICAL
CARE WITH THE VA UNDER THE MATHEWS V. ELDRIDGE TEST

In order to analyze PTSD disability compensation and medical care
procedures under the procedural due process test laid out in Mathews v.
Eldridge,110 this Comment focuses on two claims asserted by the veterans
groups Veterans for Common Sense and Veterans United for Truth, who
work to improve the lives and situations of veterans.111 The two veterans
groups came together in Veterans for Common Sense v. Nicholson, where
they asserted a variety of claims against the VA for its inefficiency in handling claims of veterans suffering from PTSD.112 Included in these assertions was the claim that veterans were deprived of procedural due process
because the VA has non-neutral decision makers adjudicating its claims.113
Although the VA moved to dismiss the various claims of the veterans
groups, the court in Nicholson denied the motion for three of four counts,
and granted one of four.114 This case then went to the Northern District of
California for a second time with the name Veterans for Common Sense v.
Peake115 as the veterans groups sought injunctive relief from the VA. In
Peake, the veterans claimed that the lack of a procedure allowing veterans
to challenge the time they receive medical care when they are experiencing
mental health emergencies is a deprivation of due process.116 The court denied the veterans groups‟ motion for preliminary injunction.117 Veterans for
Common Sense and Veterans United for Truth have filed an appeal to the
decision to the Ninth Circuit Court.118
As a result of these cases, the two main aspects of the disability compensation and medical care claims procedures within the United States Deciples which will either instruct or endure. The balance is simply an ad hoc weighing which
depends to a great extent upon how the Court subjectively views the underlying interests at
stake.”).
109. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
110. Id.
111. Veterans
for
Common
Sense,
About
VCS,
http://www.veteransforcommonsense.org/index.php/about-vcs (last visited Apr. 26, 2010).
112. Nicholson, 2008 WL 114919, at *2. The court did not address the issue of nonneutral adjudicators within the VA in depth. See id. at *15-17.
113. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 50, Veterans for Common
Sense v. Nicholson, No. C-07-3758 SC, 2008 WL 114919 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008), 2007
WL 4718845.
114. Nicholson, 2008 WL 114919, at *20.
115. Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1055-56 (N.D.
Cal. 2008).
116. Id. at 1081-82.
117. Id. at 1091-92.
118. See Appellants‟ Opening Brief at 35-36, Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake,
No. 08-16728 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2008), 2008 WL 6913188.
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partment of Veterans Affairs will be analyzed under procedural due
process. The first element of the test, where it must be shown that a “private
interest that will be affected by the official action,”119 is satisfied because a
veteran‟s disability compensation and medical care benefits qualify as
property interests. Analysis of the second prong of the Mathews test, “the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards,”120 demonstrates that the VA claims and medical procedures in
the Veterans Judicial Review Act of 1988121 do not have a high risk of erroneous deprivation. More specifically, the Comment will address the procedural due process claims, made by Veterans for Common Sense and Veterans United for Truth, that the lack of neutral decision-makers and the lack
of an additional procedure enabling a veteran with a mental health emergency to challenge the timing of medical care if he is given a later appointment. The Comment concludes that these do not create a high risk of erroneous deprivation and therefore the second prong is not met. And finally,
the last prong requiring the analysis of the government‟s interest122 is not
met because the substitution and addition of procedures would be burdensome to the VA. Since the second and the third prongs are not satisfied, the
Comment concludes that the veterans do not have a valid procedural due
process claim regarding these specific claims of deprivation.123
A.

FIRST PRONG: THE PRIVATE INTEREST OF PROPERTY AFFECTED

The first prong of the procedural due process test laid out in Mathews
v. Eldridge checks to see if the procedures that are in place affect an interest
of the individual.124 In the present situation, it is necessary to analyze
whether the procedures that are currently in place and used by the VA for
determining PTSD claims and medical care affect a veteran‟s interest.125
The Due Process Clause includes constitutional protection when an individual has been deprived of life, liberty, or property.126 A veteran who is
claiming compensation for a service-connected disability or is seeking medical care has a property interest at stake.127
119. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
120. Id.
121. Veterans Judicial Review Act of 1988, 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2006 & Supp. II
2008).
122. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
127. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“To have a
property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire
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A major Supreme Court decision, Goldberg v. Kelly, analyzed procedural due process and the deprivation of property.128 The case involved residents of New York City who claimed they were deprived of procedural due
process when the welfare benefits they were receiving through federallyfunded programs, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, were
terminated without notice or a hearing given beforehand.129 The Court
found that the claimants‟ property interest was affected because the loss of
welfare payments would be a significant detriment in the daily lives of the
recipients.130 Although the argument between a constitutional right and a
privilege has often been made in the past, the Goldberg Court has found
that no such distinction seems to exist anymore, as it holds welfare payments to be considered property because “[s]uch sources of security . . . are
no longer regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients they are essentials.”131
A similar problem presented itself to the Supreme Court when the case
of Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth came forth two years later.132
Here, the plaintiff was an assistant professor at Wisconsin State University
at Oshkosh who claimed the university he had worked for deprived him of
procedural due process when the university did not rehire him for the next
academic year.133 Roth claimed that one of the interests he was deprived of
by not being rehired by Wisconsin State University was his property interest.134 The Court went into a detailed analysis about the definition of the
word “property.”135 The Court held that “property” is a broad term and that
“the Court [had] fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between
„rights' and „privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of pro-

for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”).
128. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
129. Id. at 255-56.
130. Id. at 263 n.8 (“It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more
like „property‟ than a „gratuity.‟ Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form
of rights that do not fall within traditional common-law concepts of property. It has been
aptly noted that „[s]ociety today is built around entitlement . . . . Such sources of security,
whether private or public, are no longer regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients
they are essentials, fully deserved, and in no sense a form of charity. It is only the poor
whose entitlements, although recognized by public policy, have not been effectively enforced.” (quoting Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965))).
131. Id.
132. Roth, 408 U.S. 564.
133. Id. at 566.
134. Id. at 571.
135. Id. at 571-72, 576-78.

www.niulawreview.org

2010]

IRAQ VETERAN'S WAR WITH THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

113

cedural due process rights.”136 The Court also clarified saying that the definition of property in regards to procedural due process protection does not
limit itself to actual ownership of things such as land and tangible goods.137
Next, the Roth Court talked about how the protection of a property interest acts as a safeguard for benefits that an individual has already gained
access to through statutory or administrative means, such as the receipt of
welfare benefits that the Court addressed in Goldberg.138 The Court stressed
that in order to have a property interest in a benefit, a person must have
more than a desire or expectation of it.139 Rather, the person must “have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”140 Justice Stewart, who wrote the majority opinion of the cases, emphasized that the procedural due process protection for property interests is meant to protect people‟s interest in things
they rely on in their daily lives.141 In this case, because Roth‟s contract was
for a fixed amount of time and was supposed to terminate after the end of
the academic year, his property interest was only protected until the termination date and did not mean he was owed another contract for the following year from the university.142
It is important to note that the decisions in Mathews, Goldberg, and
Roth seem to say that procedural due process protection is afforded only
when the claimants have already been receiving the benefit or entitlement.143 Although the Court may analyze whether or not the claimant has
“present enjoyment”144 of the benefit, it does not appear to limit or restrict
procedural due process protection to only such instances.
In the case of American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan,145 where employees filed a complaint because their medical benefits
were terminated without prior notice or hearing, the Court clarified the
broader definition for what qualifies as a property interest under procedural
due process.146 The Court first made a point that in Goldberg and Mathews,
136. Id. at 571 n.9 (citing prior cases where it was ruled “that public employment in
general was a „privilege,‟ not a „right,‟ and that procedural due process guarantees therefore
were inapplicable” (quoting Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951))).
137. Roth, 408 U.S. at 572.
138. Id. at 576 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
139. Id. at 577.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578.
143. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 320 (1976); Roth, 408 U.S. at 576
(“The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits.”); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
144. Baldwin v. Hous. Auth. of Camden, 278 F. Supp. 2d 365, 378 (D.N.J. 2003).
145. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
146. Id. at 47, 61.
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the claimants had a property “interest in continued payment of benefits [before they] could be terminated.”147 However, the Court strayed from this
concept and said that the present case was different.148 Under Pennsylvania
law, for an employee to claim a property interest, two elements needed to
be proved: “First, he must prove that an employer is liable for a workrelated injury, and second, he must establish that the particular medical
treatment at issue is reasonable and necessary.”149 When these two factors
are met, is when the employee has the same property interest such as those
found in Goldberg and Mathews.150
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held in Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors,151 that past decisions “establish that „due
process‟ is a flexible concept—that the processes required by the Clause
with respect to the termination of a protected interest will vary depending
upon the importance attached to the interest and the particular circumstances under which the deprivation may occur.”152 Here, the Court acknowledged that the way an interest is measured for qualification of procedural due process protection varies depending on circumstances and significance.153 However, the Court also acknowledged that although “[t]he District Court held that applicants for benefits, no less than persons already
receiving them, had a „legitimate claim of entitlement‟ to benefits if they
met the statutory qualifications,” the Supreme Court has never clearly ruled
on the matter.154
Although the Supreme Court has not clearly held that applicants for
benefits have a property interest under procedural due process, it has been
so held in every circuit court that benefit applicants may possess a property
interest for benefits, such as welfare entitlements.155 Also, the circuit court
147. Id. at 60.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 61.
150. Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 61.
151. Walters v. Nat‟l Ass‟n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
152. Id. at 320 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
153. Walters, 473 U.S. at 320.
154. Id. at 321 n.8.
155. Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir. 2005); see Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d
549, 557-59 (6th Cir. 2004); Foss v. Nat‟l Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 588 (9th
Cir. 1998); Flatford v. Chater, 93 F.3d 1296, 1304-05 (6th Cir. 1996); Mallette v. Arlington
County Employees' Supp. Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 637-40 (4th Cir. 1996); Kraebel v. New
York City Dep't of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 959 F.2d 395, 404-05 (2d Cir. 1992); Ward v.
Downtown Dev. Auth., 786 F.2d 1526, 1531 (11th Cir. 1986); Daniels v. Woodbury County,
742 F.2d 1128, 1132-33 (8th Cir. 1984); Charry v. Hall, 709 F.2d 139, 144 (2d Cir. 1983);
Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489-90 (3d Cir. 1980); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d
118, 121-22 (9th Cir. 1979); Basciano v. Herkimer, 605 F.2d 605, 609 (2d Cir. 1978); Raper
v. Lucey, 488 F.2d 748, 752 (1st Cir. 1973).
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made clear in Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock156 that even if it is found that
someone does not satisfy the prerequisites and the conditions “necessary to
receive the benefit, the underlying property entitlement remains and cannot
be denied without due process of law.”157 Therefore, an individual still has
a property interest. In fact, when the Supreme Court is faced with procedural due process questions of law when the individual is a benefits applicant,
the court will assume a claim of entitlement for applicants.158
By taking procedural due process jurisprudence into account, veterans
who seek disability compensation and medical care for their serviceconnected disability of PTSD have a property interest. Although the situation does not chiefly concern veterans who have already been granted disability compensation and medical care and then had it terminated, such as
the discontinued welfare benefits in Goldberg159 or social security disability
benefits in Mathews,160 veterans still have a property interest as applicants
for disability compensation and medical care. Most of the veterans seeking
disability compensation and medical care in the present situation did not
have present enjoyment of the benefits—they are still trying to receive
them. However, veterans still have a property interest because, as noted in
Roth, they have more than a desire or expectation of it.161 Rather, compensation for their disability and medical care is a necessity in order to treat
PTSD and they have a legitimate claim to their entitlements from the VA
because it is something they would rely on in their daily lives.162 As many
federal courts have already noted, applicants have a property interest so
long as they fulfill their statutory requirements.163
The court in Devine v. Cleland decided that eligible veterans have a
property interest in educational benefits from the VA.164 Furthermore, in the
case of Veterans for Common Sense v. Nicholson,165 the court held that a
statute requiring that the VA and its Secretary provide medical services for
156. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2004), rev‟d en banc
in part and cert. granted on other grounds, 543 U.S. 955 (2004).
157. Id. at 1103 n.7.
158. Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 942 (1986).
159. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
160. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
161. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
162. Id.
163. Walters v. Nat‟l Ass‟n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 (1985).
164. Devine v. Cleland, 616 F.2d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The class, if „eligible
veterans‟ as defined by 38 U.S.C. § 1652(a)(1), and if enrolled and taking the prescribed
units of approved courses at an educational institution meeting the requirements of 38 U.S.C.
§ 1651 et seq., has a statutory entitlement to receipt of an educational assistance allowance.
Such a statutory entitlement does constitute a „property right‟ protected by the Due Process
Clause.” (citation omitted)).
165. Veterans for Common Sense v. Nicholson, 2008 WL 114919, at *18 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 10, 2008).

www.niulawreview.org

116

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 1

veterans “does in fact create a property interest protected by the Due
Process Clause.”166
Because a property interest exists when a claimant relies on it in their
daily lives167 and courts have ruled that a veteran‟s medical care qualifies as
a property interest,168 it is clear that veterans who are seeking serviceconnected PTSD disability compensation and medical care have a property
interest. Therefore, the first element of the procedural due process test laid
out in Mathews v. Eldridge has been satisfied. 169
B.

SECOND PRONG: ERRONEOUS DEPRIVATION OF THE PROPERTY
INTEREST THROUGH PROCEDURES USED BY THE VA

The second prong of the procedural due process test laid out in Mathews v. Eldridge is analyzing “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.”170 The Supreme Court has
defined the meaning of a deprivation regarding property interests in Goldberg171 and Roth.172 In Goldberg, the Supreme Court held that the termination of aid can constitute a deprivation of a property interest, especially
when the interest is the claimant‟s way of life—such as a welfare recipient
whose welfare benefits were terminated.173 On the contrary, in Roth, the
Supreme Court made it clear that if one has a property interest in employment, it could not be terminated without a hearing and a statement of reasons.174 However, because Roth did not have an established property interest in the first place, it could not be taken away from him—and he therefore
was not deprived of anything.175 As a result, the Supreme Court seems to
define deprivation as the termination or taking away of an interest. When
the termination is improper or faulty, it constitutes an erroneous deprivation.176
166. Id.
167. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
168. Nicholson, 2008 WL 114919, at *18.
169. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
170. Id.
171. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
172. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578.
173. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 (“[T]ermination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live
while he waits.”).
174. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578 (“In these circumstances, the respondent surely had an
abstract concern in being rehired, but he did not have a property interest sufficient to require
the University authorities to give him a hearing when they declined to renew his contract of
employment.”).
175. Id.
176. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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In applying this prong to veterans with PTSD and their disability
claims, it is necessary to examine the consequences of an erroneous deprivation of a veteran‟s property interest regarding disability compensation or
medical care. If a veteran with PTSD is denied disability compensation, the
means by which he lives could be taken from him, very much like the welfare recipient in Goldberg.177 The symptoms of PTSD can be so severe in
some people that it prohibits them from getting and keeping a job.178 If veterans are unable to obtain employment, they have no income and are dependent on disability compensation from the VA in order to meet their basic needs of food and shelter.179 Therefore, if a lower rating is given when a
veteran cannot work, the veteran will get less money or no money which
would negatively and severely affect his means to live. It is clear that an
erroneous deprivation of disability compensation and medical care could
have grave, negative consequences. It is also important to acknowledge that
while benefits such as social security payments can be adjusted if there was
an erroneous deprivation through retroactive payments,180 it is more difficult to adjust disability compensation and medical care for veterans. If veterans cannot work, they have no source of income and are in dire need of
their disability compensation in order to live. If the veterans do not receive
medical treatment in a timely fashion, one cannot reverse the effects of
PTSD, which can become worse with time.181 An erroneous deprivation
carried out by the VA would clearly have terrible and risky consequences.
Now that the consequences of an erroneous deprivation have been analyzed, it is necessary to examine whether current procedures of the VA allow for a high risk of erroneous deprivation. The central cases that deal
with veteran applicants for PTSD disability claims and medical care, which
address the second prong of the Mathews v. Eldridge test under a procedural due process analysis, are Veterans for Common Sense v. Nicholson182 and
Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake.183As mentioned before, veterans
groups are asserting and arguing two main reasons as to why the VA‟s cur177. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.
178. 38 C.F.R. § 4.130 (2008); see Joseph Shapiro, Attitudes, PTSD Complicate Iraq
Vet‟s
Job
Search,
NPR,
Nov.
12,
2007,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16175287 (“Kraft is one of them.
Looking back at his time at MTV Networks, he realizes he would go to work and have
trouble concentrating. Only later would he come to understand that as a symptom of his own
PTSD.”).
179. Id.
180. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 342.
181. National Institute of Mental Health, supra note 42 (“In some people, the condition becomes chronic.”).
182. Veterans for Common Sense v. Nicholson, No. C-07-3758 SC, 2008 WL
114919 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008).
183. Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
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rent procedures allow veterans who are seeking disability compensation and
medical care to face a high risk of being deprived of their property interest
in their benefits.184 First, the plaintiffs argue that the procedures and criteria
contained in chapters of the Veterans Judicial Review Act of 1988
(VJRA)185 do not permit a proper adjudication system for veterans disability claims because the VA does not have neutral decision-makers.186 Second,
the veterans groups argue that the lack of an additional procedure allowing
veterans to challenge the timing of medical care in emergency situations, if
they are turned away for a later appointment, deprives veterans of due
process.187
1.

The First Argument of Veterans Groups: Procedures Used by the VA
Do Not Allow Neutral Decision Makers

The authority and the nature of the decision-makers within the Department of Veterans Affairs must be analyzed. As mentioned before, when
a veteran first files a claim, it is reviewed by the VA‟s regional office and
they determine what rating and amount of money the veteran shall receive.188 But if the veteran disagrees and wants to appeal the rating or the
decision given by the VA, veterans are given one year to appeal their disability compensation by giving a written notice of disagreement.189 After the
VA gives the veteran their Statement of the Case, the veteran then has sixty
days to file for an appeal.190 The decision will then go to the Board of Veterans‟ Appeals, which are VA adjudicators who decide the cases on the
behalf of the VA secretary.191 After reviewing this process of a veteran‟s
disability claim, it is clear that there are two different positions that decide a
veteran‟s PTSD disability claim. There are the veterans law judges (VLJs)
who are employed by the BVA to serve in the VA‟s very own court system
when a veteran appeals a decision.192 There are also rating specialists who

184. Id.
185. Veterans Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105
(1988).
186. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 1082, 1089.
187. Appellants‟ Opening Brief at 35-36, Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, No.
08-16728 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2008), 2008 WL 6913188.
188. Department of Veterans Affairs, Federal Benefits for Veterans and Dependents,
2008, at 89, http://www.va.gov/opa/vadocs/fedben.pdf.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Veterans Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105
(1988) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (2006 & Supp. II 2008)); 38 U.S.C. §
7253(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
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sit on the ratings board at the VA‟s regional office which makes the initial
decision on a claim.193
In Veterans for Common Sense v. Nicholson, the plaintiffs argued that
statutory regulations allow the VA to be the single entity that both tries the
facts and decides the claim—the VA therefore has “dual authority.”194 The
plaintiffs also contended that the “inherent conflict in the VA‟s dual role is
reflected in the VA‟s own regulations, which on the one hand require the
VA to assist a veteran in gathering information to support a claim, but then
qualifies that responsibility by requiring that the decision „protect[ ] the
interests of the government.‟”195 It was argued that the VA had given their
employees two contradicting objectives to follow in their occupation.196
The first group of employees to analyze for their neutrality in their decision making is VLJs. VLJs are employed by the BVA to serve in the
VA‟s very own court system.197 The fact that veterans‟ appeals regarding
their disability compensation and medical treatment are being decided by
non-independent adjudicators might seem frightening to some. After all,
VLJs are employed by a branch of the VA, the same department who pays
their salaries, and as a result, the judges may be more likely to be biased
and side with the position of their employer.
VLJs are similar to Administrative Law Judges [hereinafter ALJs]—
they both “preside[ ] at an administrative trial-type proceeding to resolve a
dispute between a federal government agency and someone affected by a
decision of that agency . . . . The major difference between federal ALJs
and the VLJs . . . is that ALJs are appointed under the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946”198 where they are appointed by the agency itself,199
whereas VLJs are appointed by the President.200
193. Department of Veterans Affairs, Federal Benefits for Veterans and Dependents,
2008, at 89, http://www.va.gov/opa/vadocs/fedben.pdf.
194. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 50, Veterans for Common
Sense v. Nicholson, No. C-07-3758 SC, 2008 WL 114919 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008), 2007
WL 4718845.
195. Id. (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) (2008)) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
196. Id.
197. Veterans Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105
(1988); 38 U.S.C. § 7253(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
198. Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs of the Committee on Veteran‟s Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 110th Cong.
(2007) (statement of Barton F. Stichman, Joint Executive Director, National Veterans Legal
Services
Program),
available
at
http://veterans.house.gov/hearings/Testimony_Print.aspx?newsid=115&Name=_Barton_F._
Stichman.
199. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2006).
200. Veterans Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105
(1988); 38 U.S.C. § 7253(b) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
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When examining the role of decision makers and administrative law
judges in past Supreme Court decisions, it is clear that they are not supposed to be partial or biased in order to afford due process.201 In the case of
Concrete Pipe and Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers
Pension Trust, the Supreme Court held that “due process requires a „neutral
and detached judge.‟”202
In Gibson v. Berryhill, the Supreme Court ruled that “[it] is sufficiently clear from our cases that those with substantial pecuniary interest in legal
proceedings should not adjudicate these disputes.”203 The case also clarifies
that “most of the law concerning disqualification because of interest applies
with equal force to administrative adjudicators.”204 Once again, the Supreme Court rules that if adjudicators stand to gain financially or have an
interest in the outcome of a case, they should not be the ones deciding the
case.205
In the federal appellate court case of Grant v. Shalala, the dissenting
opinion by Circuit Judge Higginbotham emphasized that although the Supreme Court has said that administrative law judges are “functionally comparable” to federal judges, it has “never held that ALJs are federal
judges.”206 He goes on to say that federal judges require independence and
impartiality from the decisions they make because of the separation of
powers doctrine in the Constitution, but the independence of an ALJ “is not
rooted in the Constitution but rather is a function of the need for administrative efficiency, the recognition of administrative expertise, and the need to
build an adequate administrative record for judicial review.”207 He writes
that ALJs are not the judiciary, but are members of the executive branch of
government.208 As a result, Judge Higginbotham is saying ALJs do not have
the same protection as federal judges from scrutiny of the court.209
201. Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S.
602, 617 (1993); see Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 215 (1971) (“Trial before „an
unbiased judge‟ is essential to due process.”); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465
(1971); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 205 (1968).
202. Concrete, 508 U.S. at 617.
203. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973).
204. Id.
205. Id.; see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
206. Grant v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332, 1354 (3d Cir. 1993) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
207. Id. (citing Weinberger v. Sulfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975)).
208. Grant, 989 F.2d at 1354. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting); see also Louis A. Chiafullo, Administrative Law-Judicial Review—District Court May Not Make Independent
Findings of Fact in a Class Action by Plaintiffs Alleging Bias of an Administrative Law
Judge—Grant v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332 (3d Cir. 1993), 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 517, 522
(1993).
209. Id.
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Although it is easy to assume that bias would be more susceptible in
an environment where those who are adjudicating are employed by the
agency that the action is taken against, the Supreme Court and several federal courts have ruled that actual bias must be shown and not just the potential for bias.210 In order for an ALJ to be disqualified from adjudicating a
claim, it is not enough to show the possibility for bias—actual bias needs to
be proved and the “mere appearance of impropriety”211 is not enough.212
There cannot be a successful procedural due process claim without showing
actual bias of the adjudicator.213 This precedent case law seemingly shows
that VLJs are not shown to be biased and therefore, a high risk for erroneous deprivation does not exist.
The second group of employees to analyze for their neutrality in their
decision making is those who sit on the rating boards of the regional offices
of the VA. The plaintiffs in Veterans for Common Sense v. Nicholson were
the first to present to the court that VA employees have a work credit system.214 Subsequently, Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake argued that
rating specialists who decide on the initial disability claim are biased because they receive credit when they decide a claim in front of a court. 215
Therefore, if the rating specialists wrongly decide a claim initially, the
claim can come through again and the raters will get additional credit to
rate the claim again.216
210. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1997) (holding that due process requires a fair trial before a judge with no actual bias); Bunnel v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 1112,
1115 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]his court holds that actual bias must be shown to disqualify an
administrative law judge.”); Guerrero-Perez v. I.N.S., 242 F.3d 727, 727 n.2 (7th Cir. 2001)
(“To successfully make out a due process claim, one has to demonstrate actual prejudice.”);
Ikpeazu v. Univ. of Neb., 775 F.2d 250, 254 (8th Cir. 1985) (“With respect to the claim of
bias, we observe that the committee members are entitled to a presumption of honesty and
integrity unless actual bias, such as personal animosity, illegal prejudice, or a personal or
financial stake in the outcome can be proven.”); Padberg v. McGrath-McKechnie, 203 F.
Supp. 2d 261, 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Plaintiffs can only overcome the presumption of honesty by showing that . . . the circumstances surrounding the proceedings posed „a risk of
actual bias or prejudgment‟ that would offend due process.”).
211. Bunnel, 336 F.3d at 1115.
212. Id.
213. Guerrero-Perez, 242 F.3d at 727 n.2.
214. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 11, 58, Veterans for Common Sense v. Nicholson, No. C-07-3758 SC, 2008 WL 114919 (N.D. Cal. 2007), 2007 WL
4718845.
215. Appellants‟ Opening Brief at 13, Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, No. 0816728 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2008), 2008 WL 6913188.
216. Board of Veterans‟ Appeals Adjudication Process and the Appeals Management
Center: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs of the
Committee on Veteran‟s Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 110th Cong. 1 (2007),
available at http://veterans.house.gov/hearings/transcript.aspx?newsid=115 [hereinafter
Hearings].
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On September 25, 2007, the members of Disability Assistance and
Memorial Affairs, a subcommittee of the Committee on Veterans‟ Affairs
in the House of Representatives had a hearing to address the growing backlog of cases at the BVA.217 Steve Smithson, the deputy director of the Veterans Affairs and Rehabilitation Commission, served as a witness at the
hearing conducted on that day. He argued:
Well right now with the end product work measure system,
the adjudicators, the rating specialist they get credit each
time they rate a case. So in the current system if I file a
claim, they rate the claim, they deny the claim, I submit
additional evidence or I file a notice of disagreement or I
question it and they come back and they rate it again, they
get another credit. They keep getting credit for that same
claim.
. . . So the system itself, as it is set up now, there is really an incentive not to do it right the first time because
they continue to get credit each time they rate that claim.218
The statements of Mr. Smithson show that the adjudicators who serve on
the rating boards of the VA may gain credits when they deny claims initially because the claims can come back through the system, with additional
evidence from the veteran, and the raters can gain additional credits.219
Their judgment is argued to be biased because they have this incentive of
receiving credits. Furthermore, a report from the Office of Inspector General of the VA also acknowledged the end product work measure system in
place at regional offices of the VA.220 The report finds employees on the
rating boards were driven to enhance their productivity to gain additional
credits and that they deviated from VBA policies and procedures in order to
do so.221
The end product work measure system is not contained in the procedures of the VA in adjudicating a claim and cannot be found in existing

217. Id. (statement of Steve Smithson, Deputy Director, Veterans Affairs and Rehabilitation Commission).
218. Id .(statement of Steve Smithson, Deputy Director, Veterans Affairs and Rehabilitation Commission).
219. Id. (statement of Steve Smithson, Deputy Director, Veterans Affairs and Rehabilitation Commission).
220. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs: Office of Inspector General, Combined
Assessment Program Review of the VA regional Office Winston-Salem, North Carolina, Apr.
27, 2004, at 5-6, http://www.va.gov/oig/CAP/VAOIG-04-00947-137.pdf.
221. Id.
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case precedent.222 Consequently, it remains unclear what the credits are—if
they are bonuses in pay, promotions, job security, or another beneficial incentive. But if the system is in use by a VA regional office, such a system
allows for erroneous deprivation because the procedures of the VA enable
employees to decide veterans‟ disability compensation claims in such a
manner where the employees can benefit themselves by making flawed
decisions. The rating specialists would have an incentive to make these
flawed decisions and would therefore create an environment where one
could expect biased decisions.223 A bill seeking to improve the processing
of claims at the VA was introduced to Congress in 2007.224 The bill‟s passage would establish the work credit system for regional offices but also
includes an additional safeguard of a procedure where “regional office of
the Veterans Benefits Administration may only receive work credit for a
claim assigned to that regional office when the appellate period for the
claim has expired or the Board of Veterans Appeals has issued a final decision with respect to the claim.”225 Under these circumstances, the raters
would not have the incentive to wrongly deny claims because they would
not receive additional credit if the claim was to come through to the board
again.226
2.

The Second Argument by Veterans Groups: The Lack of an Additional
Procedure Allowing Veterans to Challenge the Timing of Medical
Care in Emergency Situations Deprives Them of Due Process

Veterans groups claim that the lack of procedures available to veterans
who are experiencing delays in receiving medical care results in a high risk
of erroneous deprivation of their property interest of medical care.227 More
specifically, the plaintiffs in Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake argue
that veterans are not allowed to appeal the timing in which they receive

222. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Federal Benefits for Veterans and Dependents, 2008, at 89, http://www.va.gov/opa/vadocs/fedben.pdf.
223. Hearings, supra note 216 (statement of Steve Smithson, Deputy Director, Veterans Affairs and Rehabilitation Commission).
224. Veterans Claims Processing Innovation Act of 2007, H.R. 3047, 110th Cong. §
713 (2007).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Appellants‟ Opening Brief at 35-36, Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, No.
08-16728 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2008), 2008 WL 6913188; see Veterans for Common Sense v.
Nicholson, No. C-07-3758 SC, 2008 WL 114919, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008) (“[Section] 1710(a)(4) does in fact create a property interest protected by the Due Process
Clause.”).
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medical care services because there are no procedures in place to do so.228
“[I]f a veteran comes in and says he or she is having suicidal thoughts, and
VA clerical staff offers him an appointment a month later, there is no
process for appealing that decision to seek an earlier appointment based on
emergency circumstances.”229 The veterans groups argue that because these
delays prolong medical treatment and no procedures are in place for veterans to challenge such delays when they are experiencing a mental health
emergency, a high risk of erroneous deprivation is created.230
The symptoms of PTSD can cause veterans to be irritable, aggressive,
have intense nightmares, and can cause them to have flashbacks.231 Furthermore, PTSD coexists with depression and substance abuse which can
lead to suicide.232 If veterans experiencing these severe symptoms are not
given medical care, a high risk is presented because their condition could
worsen and their lives would be at risk. With additional safeguards, such as
procedures allowing veterans to challenge an appointment decision by VA
medical facilities, this risk can be minimized so that the veteran gets help
sooner.
The interest is obviously high because veterans‟ lives, mental health,
and well-being are at stake when dealing with PTSD.233 However, as the
court correctly concluded in Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, the risk
of erroneous deprivation is less.234 During the trial, the court was presented
with evidentiary testimony that veterans who go to VA medical facilities
with mental health emergencies are seen immediately.235 The court acknowledged it was not a guarantee that every veteran who seeks treatment
for emergency mental health issues will receive immediate care.236 The
court also concluded that the risk of erroneous deprivation was not high
because the plaintiffs did not prove “a systemic denial or unreasonable delay in mental health care.”237 If it is common practice that those experiencing mental health emergencies are seen immediately, then there likely is no
risk of erroneous deprivation. However, it is important to note that the court
228. Appellants‟ Opening Brief at 35-36, Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, No.
08-16728 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2008), 2008 WL 6913188.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 39 (“And these delays, when combined with the critical nature of mental
health care, and the absence of any procedure by which to challenge such delays, result in an
unacceptably high risk of erroneous deprivation.”).
231. National Institute of Mental Health, supra note 42.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1081 (N.D. Cal
2008).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1081-82.
237. Id. at 1082.
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did not define what a “systemic denial”238 would require.239 It is unclear
how many veterans must be denied medical care before it is considered to
be a systemic denial, which the court seems to suggest would present a high
risk of erroneous deprivation.240
C.

THIRD PRONG: THE GOVERNMENT‟S INTEREST

The third prong of the Mathews v. Eldridge test analyzes the government‟s interest and administrative convenience, which includes “the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”241 In the present situation, the substitute procedure of having judges who are not employed by the
VA adjudicate claims and the substitute procedure of having rating specialists at regional offices not receive credit for their work unless their claims
are accurate needs to be analyzed. Also, the additional safeguard of including a procedure where veterans who are experiencing emergency mental
health issues can appeal the timing of their appointment should be analyzed.242
When the Supreme Court has applied the government interest prong in
the past, it has considered different aspects.243 In Mathews, the Court said
substantial financial burdens should be considered.244 The Court also said
that although financial cost is not the only factor considered, the government‟s interest is also the public‟s interest, and as a result “conserving
scarce fiscal and administrative resources is a factor that must be
weighed.”245 In Goldberg, the court considered the “[promotion] of general
welfare”246 as a government interest.
238. Id.
239. Appellants‟ Opening Brief at 39, Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, No. 0816728 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2008), 2008 WL 6913188.
240. See Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 1082.
241. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see CHEMERINSKY, supra note
88, at 558-59.
242. Appellants‟ Opening Brief at 35-36, Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, No.
08-16728 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2008), 2008 WL 6913188.
243. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970).
244. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347 (“This includes the administrative burden and other
societal costs that would be associated with requiring, as a matter of constitutional right, an
evidentiary hearing upon demand in all cases prior to the termination of disability benefits.
The most visible burden would be the incremental cost resulting from the increased number
of hearings and the expense of providing benefits to ineligible recipients pending decision.”).
245. Id. (“Financial cost alone is not a controlling weight in determining whether due
process requires a particular procedural safeguard prior to some administrative decision. But
the Government's interest, and hence that of the public, in conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources is a factor that must be weighed. At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society in
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The first area of substitute procedure to analyze would be to have
judges who are not employed by the VA to adjudicate appeals for disability
ratings given at regional offices to dispose of any potential for bias. This
would, no doubt, prove to be an enormous administrative burden on the
VA, because they would have to revamp their entire appeals process if they
are required to remove VLJs and abandon their court system. 247 If veteran‟s
appeals were not handled within the VA‟s own court system, it would presumably cause a large backlog of cases within the federal court system.
The second substitute procedure to analyze would be to make it so that
rating specialists and regional offices of the VA “only receive work credit
for a claim assigned to that regional office when the appellate period for the
claim has expired or the Board of Veterans Appeals has issued a final decision with respect to the claim”248 in order to dispose of the bias raters may
have due to the incentive to earn more credits.249 The burden this procedure
may have on the VA and the government is that the current end product
work measure system in place is used as a monitoring and management
tool.250 This is necessary to monitor because a “[c]orrect work measurement
is essential to substantiate proper staffing requirements and determine proterms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost. Significantly, the cost of protecting those whom the preliminary administrative process has identified as likely to be found undeserving may in the end come out of the pockets of the deserving since resources available for any particular program of social welfare are not unlimited.”
(citing Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1303 (1975))).
246. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264-65 (“[I]mportant governmental interests are promoted by affording recipients a pre-termination evidentiary hearing. From its founding the
Nation's basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders. We have come to recognize that forces not within the control of the poor
contribute to their poverty. This perception, against the background of our traditions, has
significantly influenced the development of the contemporary public assistance system.
Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the
poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life
of the community. At the same time, welfare guards against the societal malaise that may
flow from a widespread sense of unjustified frustration and insecurity. Public assistance,
then, is not mere charity, but a means to „promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.‟ The same governmental interests that counsel
the provision of welfare, counsel as well its uninterrupted provision to those eligible to receive it; pre-termination evidentiary hearings are indispensable to that end.” (footnote omitted)).
247. See 38 U.S.C. § 7253(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
248. Veterans Claims Processing Innovation Act of 2007, H.R. 3047, 110th Cong. §
713 (2007).
249. Hearings, supra note 216 (statement of Steve Smithson, Deputy Director, Veterans Affairs and Rehabilitation Commission).
250. DEP‟T OF VET. AFF., VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION MANUAL, M21-4,
App.
C,
Change
72:
§
I
(Oct.
3,
2006),
http://www.warms.vba.va.gov/admin21/m21_4/chg72.doc.
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ductive capacity.”251 The system is also helpful in formulating budgets.252
However, implementing this procedure would not cause an undue burden
for the VA, because as the VA may still monitor claims and backlog, they
may only reward rating specialists and regional offices after the appellate
period for a claim has expired or the BVA has given its final decision. 253
This procedure would not pose financial burdens, seeing that the system is
already in place. The VA would just be changing the time in which it
awards credits.
The last procedure to analyze is the additional safeguard of including a
procedure where veterans can appeal the timing of medical care if they are
experiencing emergency mental health issues and are turned away.254 The
court in Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake correctly concluded “additional safeguards at this level would impose burdens on the VA.”255 The
court based its conclusion on the Supreme Court decision of Parham v. J.R.
where the Court said the government “has a genuine interest in allocating
priority to the diagnosis and treatment of patients as soon as they are admitted to a hospital rather than to time-consuming procedural minuets before
the admission.”256 The Supreme Court also stressed that the government has
a strong interest in seeing that its expensive healthcare system is being used
by people who truly need it.257 In the opening brief filed by the veterans
groups for Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, the plaintiffs argue that
because the VA already has procedures in place to challenge clinical decisions, it should not be burdensome to expand the challenges to scheduling
decisions.258 However, these areas are entirely different. Challenging a clinical decision involves the reconsideration of a medical decision made at a
veteran‟s health facility.259 Therefore, the veteran has already seen an ex-

251. Id.
252. Id. (“Received and completed end products are also used to formulate the annual budget submission to the Secretary, OMB, the President, and Congress.”).
253. Veterans Claims Processing Innovation Act of 2007, H.R. 3047, 110th Cong. §
713 (2007).
254. Appellants‟ Opening Brief at 35-36, Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, No.
08-16728 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2008), 2008 WL 6913188.
255. Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1082 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605 (1979)).
256. Parham, 442 U.S. at 605.
257. Id. at 604-05.
258. Appellants‟ Opening Brief at 39, Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, No. 0816728 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2008), 2008 WL 6913188.
259. DEP‟T VET. AFF., VHA HANDBOOK: VHA PATIENT ADVOCACY PROGRAM 1
(Sept.
2,
2005),
http://www1.va.gov/VHAPUBLICATIONS/ViewPublication.asp?pub_ID=1303 (“A clinical
appeal is a higher-level reconsideration request to override a medical decision made at the
facility level.”).
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aminer and does not agree with the medical decision rendered.260 Implementing a procedure where veterans can challenge the time they obtain
medical care when they are experiencing a mental health emergency lays
wholly outside of the realm of clinical decision appeals—the veteran is not
challenging a medical decision, but his timing of receiving care. It would be
a completely new type of challenge that would need adjudication, which
means it will cost the VA more money and time.
Outside the substitute procedure for rating specialists and regional offices of the VA only receiving credit when a claim‟s appellate period has
expired or when there has been a final decision given by the BVA, the other
procedures mentioned would be highly burdensome on the VA because of
costs and efficiency. Therefore, there is a lack of government interest when
it comes to replacing VLJs and the VA‟s court system, and adding the additional procedure of allowing veterans to challenge the timing of when they
receive medical care when they are experiencing a mental health emergency.

V.

CONCLUSION

Mathews v. Eldridge provides a balancing test in determining procedural due process.261 The test requires the analysis of three different areas:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government‟s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.262
The first prong of the test was easily satisfied. Based on the prior rulings of
the Supreme Court in Goldberg,263 Roth,264 and Mathews,265 a clear property
interest in veteran‟s disability compensation and medical care was established. The second prong of the risk of an erroneous deprivation and the
value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards was not so easily

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Id.; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 88, at 558-59.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340-41.
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satisfied.266 Although the degree of the consequence of an erroneous deprivation could have serious, negative effects, the assertions of the lack of
neutral decision-makers and the need for an additional procedure for challenging the timing of medical care in mental health emergencies did not
show a high risk for erroneous deprivations. The actual bias of VLJs would
need to be shown in order to violate due process. The rating specialists at
regional offices of the VA are given credits for claims and may have an
incentive to make improper decisions on claims in order to receive more
credits. Adding a procedure for challenging the timing of medical care in
mental health issue emergencies does not have a high risk for erroneous
deprivations because individuals with emergency mental health issues are
usually seen immediately. The third prong of government interest was also
not satisfied because the substitute and additional procedures seemed to be
burdensome on the VA. The substitute procedure of having non-VA employees adjudicate veterans claims would require the VA to abandon its
current court system completely.267 The substitute procedure for rating specialists and regional offices of the VA only receiving credit when a claim‟s
appellate period has expired or when there has been a final decision given
by the BVA does not burden the VA because the only change is in the timing of the credit given.268 Lastly, the additional procedure where veterans
can appeal the timing of medical care if they are experiencing emergency
mental health issues and are turned away would impose a burden on the
government because it would be a new type of challenge that would need
adjudication, which means it will cost the VA more money and time.
As a result, the risk of erroneous deprivation is not high enough to
outweigh the lack of government interest. Veterans were not deprived of
procedural due process under the analysis of neutral decision makers adjudicating claims and the need for an additional procedure where veterans can
appeal the timing of medical care if they are experiencing emergency mental health issues and are turned away. If the risk of erroneous deprivation is
not high and the government does not have an interest, there is no procedural due process claim.269
With it determined that veterans were not deprived of procedural due
process under these specific claims, the VA needs to continue improving in
processing veterans claims for disability compensation and medical care.
PTSD is a mental condition that can become worse with time and the veterans who have returned from Iraq and Afghanistan need to be treated
266. Id. at 335.
267. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 50, Veterans for Common
Sense v. Nicholson, No. C-07-3758 SC, 2008 WL 114919 (N.D. Cal. 2007), 2007 WL
4718845.
268. Id.
269. Mathews, 424 U.S. 319.
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promptly.270 More than 300,000 veterans, which is one out of five who have
been deployed, have returned from their service suffering from PTSD or
major depression, like Joseph Dwyer.271 Now that they served our country,
the VA should be all that it can be for the veterans.
PURVI SHAH

National Institute of Mental Health, supra note 42.
RAND Corporation, supra note 49; see Demons, supra note 1.
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